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Documents auto-save by default. It incorporates some features seen in iOS 5, which include Game Center , support for iMessage in the new Messages messaging application, and Reminders as a to-do list app separate from iCal which is renamed as Calendar, like the iOS app.

It also includes support for storing iWork documents in iCloud. Application pop-ups are now concentrated on the corner of the screen, and the Center itself is pulled from the right side of the screen.

Mountain Lion also includes more Chinese features, including support for Baidu as an option for Safari search engine. Notes is added, as an application separate from Mail, synching with its iOS counterpart [57] [58] through the iCloud service. Messages, an instant messaging software application , [59] replaces iChat. Mavericks requires 2GB of memory to operate. It is the first version named under Apple’s then-new theme of places in California , dubbed Mavericks after the surfing location.

It featured a major overhaul of user interface, replaced skeuomorphism with flat graphic design and blurred translucency effects, following the aesthetic introduced with iOS 7. It introduced features called Continuity and Handoff, which allow for tighter integration between paired OS X and iOS devices: the user can handle phone calls or text messages on either their Mac or their iPhone, and edit the same Pages document on either their Mac or their iPad.

Apple described this release as containing “Refinements to the Mac Experience” and “Improvements to System Performance” rather than new features. Refinements include public transport built into the Maps application, GUI improvements to the Notes application, as well as adopting San Francisco as the system font. Metal API , an application enhancing software, had debuted in this operating system, being available to “all Macs since “.

The update brought Siri to macOS, featuring several Mac-specific features, like searching for files. It also allowed websites to support Apple Pay as a method of transferring payment, using either a nearby iOS device or Touch ID to authenticate. It was released publicly on September 20, It was released on September 25, In addition, numerous changes were made to standard applications including Photos, Safari, Notes, and Spotlight.

It was released on September 24, Some of the key new features were the Dark mode, Desktop stacks and Dynamic Desktop, which changes the desktop background image to correspond to the user’s current time of day.

It was released on October 7, It primarily focuses on updates to built-in apps, such as replacing iTunes with separate Music, Podcasts, and TV apps, redesigned Reminders and Books apps, and a new Find My app. It also features Sidecar, which allows the user to use an iPad as a second screen for their computer, or even simulate a graphics tablet with an Apple Pencil. It is the first version of macOS not to support bit applications. The Dashboard application was also removed in the update.

It was released on October 25, Universal Control allows users to use a single Keyboard and Mouse to move between devices. Airplay now allows users to present and share almost anything. The Shortcuts app was also introduced to macOS, giving users access to galleries of pre-built shortcuts, designed for Macs, a service brought from iOS.

Users can now also set up shortcuts, among other things. Currently in beta testing, the public release is expected to be available in late From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. History of Apple’s current Mac operating system. Rhapsody Developer Release Hera Server 1. This section does not cite any sources. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.

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Archived from the original on June 17, Apple Newsroom. July 18, Archived from the original on January 3, Retrieved January 2, May 6, June 23, October 28, Archived from the original on September 28, Retrieved September 28, June 9, Archived from the original on November 1, October 20, July 11, Archived from the original on October 1, February 16, Archived from the original on November 23, July 25, Archived from the original on October 10, June 10, Archived from the original on February 13, June 2, Archived from the original on October 9, June 8, Archived from the original on October 8, June 13, Retrieved February 25, Apple Developer Connection.

Archived from the original on September 25, Retrieved March 5, Archived from the original on December 20, Retrieved December 20, Ars Technica. Startups do not yet know who their customer is or what their product should be. As the world becomes more uncertain, it gets harder and harder to predict the future. The old management methods are not up to the task. Planning and forecasting are only accurate when based on a long, stable operating history and a relatively static environment.

This school believes that if management is the problem, chaos is the answer. It may seem counterintuitive to think that something as disruptive, innovative, and chaotic as a startup can be managed or, to be accurate, must be managed.

Most people think of process and management as boring and dull, whereas startups are dynamic and exciting. But what is actually exciting is to see startups succeed and change the world. The passion, energy, and vision that people bring to these new ventures are resources too precious to waste.

We can— and must—do better. This book is about how. I identify who is an entrepreneur, de ne a startup, and articulate a new way for startups to gauge if they are making progress, called validated learning. But when it comes to startups and innovation, we are still shooting in the dark. These are new problems, born of the success of management in the twentieth century. This book attempts to put entrepreneurship and innovation on a rigorous footing. It is our challenge to do something great with the opportunity we have been given.

The Lean Startup movement seeks to ensure that those of us who long to build the next big thing will have the tools we need to change the world. This often comes as a surprise to aspiring entrepreneurs, because their associations with these two words are so diametrically opposed. Entrepreneurs are rightly wary of implementing traditional management practices early on in a startup, afraid that they will invite bureaucracy or stifle creativity.

Entrepreneurs have been trying to t the square peg of their unique problems into the round hole of general management for decades. Unfortunately, this approach leads to chaos more often than it does to success. I should know: my rst startup failures were all of this kind.

The tremendous success of general management over the last century has provided unprecedented material abundance, but those management principles are ill suited to handle the chaos and uncertainty that startups must face. I believe that entrepreneurship requires a managerial discipline to harness the entrepreneurial opportunity we have been given.

There are more entrepreneurs operating today than at any previous time in history. This has been made possible by dramatic changes in the global economy. To cite but one example, one often hears commentators lament the loss of manufacturing jobs in the United States over the previous two decades, but one rarely hears about a corresponding loss of manufacturing capability.

In e ect, the huge productivity increases made possible by modern management and technology have created more productive capacity than rms know what to do with. Despite this lack of rigor, we are nding some ways to make money, but for every success there are far too many failures: products pulled from shelves mere weeks after being launched, high-pro le startups lauded in the press and forgotten a few months later, and new products that wind up being used by nobody.

The Lean Startup movement is dedicated to preventing these failures. Lean thinking is radically altering the way supply chains and production systems are run.

Among its tenets are drawing on the knowledge and creativity of individual workers, the shrinking of batch sizes, just-in-time production and inventory control, and an acceleration of cycle times. It taught the world the di erence between value-creating activities and waste and showed how to build quality into products from the inside out. The Lean Startup adapts these ideas to the context of entrepreneurship, proposing that entrepreneurs judge their progress di erently from the way other kinds of ventures do.

With scientific learning as our yardstick, we can discover and eliminate the sources of waste that are plaguing entrepreneurship. A comprehensive theory of entrepreneurship should address all the functions of an early-stage venture: vision and concept, product development, marketing and sales, scaling up, partnerships and distribution, and structure and organizational design.

It has to provide a method for measuring progress in the context of extreme uncertainty. It can give entrepreneurs clear guidance on how to make the many trade-o decisions they face: whether and when to invest in process; formulating, planning, and creating infrastructure; when to go it alone and when to partner; when to respond to feedback and when to stick with vision; and how and when to invest in scaling the business.

Most of all, it must allow entrepreneurs to make testable predictions. For example, consider the recommendation that you build cross- functional teams and hold them accountable to what we call learning milestones instead of organizing your company into strict functional departments marketing, sales, information technology, human resources, etc.

Perhaps you agree with this recommendation, or perhaps you are skeptical. Either way, if you decide to implement it, I predict that you pretty quickly will get feedback from your teams that the new process is reducing their productivity.

It is a straightforward prediction of the Lean Startup theory itself. When people are used to evaluating their productivity locally, they feel that a good day is one in which they did their job well all day. When I worked as a programmer, that meant eight straight hours of programming without interruption.

That was a good day. In contrast, if I was interrupted with questions, process, or—heaven forbid—meetings, I felt bad. What did I really accomplish that day? Code and product features were tangible to me; I could see them, understand them, and show them off. Learning, by contrast, is frustratingly intangible. The Lean Startup asks people to start measuring their productivity di erently. The goal of a startup is to gure out the right thing to build—the thing customers want and will pay for—as quickly as possible.

In other words, the Lean Startup is a new way of looking at the development of innovative new products that emphasizes fast iteration and customer insight, a huge vision, and great ambition, all at the same time.

Henry Ford is one of the most successful and celebrated entrepreneurs of all time. Since the idea of management has been bound up with the history of the automobile since its rst days, I believe it is tting to use the automobile as a metaphor for a startup. An internal combustion automobile is powered by two important and very di erent feedback loops. The rst feedback loop is deep inside the engine.

He spent his days and nights tinkering in his garage with the precise mechanics of getting the engine cylinders to move. Each tiny explosion within the cylinder provides the motive force to turn the wheels but also drives the ignition of the next explosion.

Unless the timing of this feedback loop is managed precisely, the engine will sputter and break down. Startups have a similar engine that I call the engine of growth. New product development happens in ts and starts. The second important feedback loop in an automobile is between the driver and the steering wheel. If you have a daily commute, you probably know the route so well that your hands seem to steer you there on their own accord.

We can practically drive the route in our sleep. The choreography of driving is incredibly complex when one slows down to think about it.

By contrast, a rocket ship requires just this kind of in-advance calibration. It must be launched with the most precise instructions on what to do: every thrust, every ring of a booster, and every change in direction. The tiniest error at the point of launch could yield catastrophic results thousands of miles later.

Unfortunately, too many startup business plans look more like they are planning to launch a rocket ship than drive a car. They prescribe the steps to take and the results to expect in excruciating detail, and as in planning to launch a rocket, they are set up in such a way that even tiny errors in assumptions can lead to catastrophic outcomes.

One company I worked with had the misfortune of forecasting signi cant customer adoption—in the millions—for one of its new products. Powered by a splashy launch, the company successfully executed its plan. Unfortunately, customers did not ock to the product in great numbers. Even worse, the company had invested in massive infrastructure, hiring, and support to handle the in ux of customers it expected.

When the customers failed to materialize, the company had committed itself so completely that they could not adapt in time. The Lean Startup method, in contrast, is designed to teach you how to drive a startup. Instead of making complex plans that are based on a lot of assumptions, you can make constant adjustments with a steering wheel called the Build-Measure-Learn feedback loop.

You remain thoroughly focused on getting to your destination. Startups also have a true north, a destination in mind: creating a thriving and world-changing business. To achieve that vision, startups employ a strategy, which includes a business model, a product road map, a point of view about partners and competitors, and ideas about who the customer will be. The product is the end result of this strategy see the chart on this page.

Products change constantly through the process of optimization, what I call tuning the engine. Less frequently, the strategy may have to change called a pivot. However, the overarching vision rarely changes. Entrepreneurs are committed to seeing the startup through to that destination. Every setback is an opportunity for learning how to get where they want to go see the chart below.

In real life, a startup is a portfolio of activities. A lot is happening simultaneously: the engine is running, acquiring new customers and serving existing ones; we are tuning, trying to improve our product, marketing, and operations; and we are steering, deciding if and when to pivot. The challenge of entrepreneurship is to balance all these activities. Even the smallest startup faces the challenge of supporting existing customers while trying to innovate.

Even the most established company faces the imperative to invest in innovation lest it become obsolete. And yet, imagine a modern manager who is tasked with building a new product in the context of an established company.

In fact, we have almost no new customers and no new revenue. However, we have learned an incredible amount and are on the cusp of a breakthrough new line of business. All we need is another year. The reason is that in general management, a failure to deliver results is due to either a failure to plan adequately or a failure to execute properly.

Both are signi cant lapses, yet new product development in our modern economy routinely requires exactly this kind of failure on the way to greatness. In the Lean Startup movement, we have come to realize that these internal innovators are actually entrepreneurs, too, and that entrepreneurial management can help them succeed; this is the subject of the next chapter. In addition to the more traditional startup entrepreneurs I meet, these people are general managers, mostly working in very large companies, who are tasked with creating new ventures or product innovations.

The biggest surprise is that they are visionaries. Like the startup founders I have worked with for years, they can see the future of their industries and are prepared to take bold risks to seek out new and innovative solutions to the problems their companies face. Mark, for example, is a manager for an extremely large company who came to one of my lectures.

He is the leader of a division that recently had been chartered to bring his company into the twenty- rst century by building a new suite of products designed to take advantage of the Internet.

Next, I tried to give him some advice about the future, about cool new highly leveraged product development technologies. I know all about the Internet, and I have a vision for how our company needs to adapt to it or die. But Mark found himself working inside the black box—and in need of guidance. What Mark was missing was a process for converting the raw materials of innovation into real-world breakthrough successes. Once a team is set up, what should it do? What process should it use?

How should it be held accountable to performance milestones? These are questions the Lean Startup methodology is designed to answer. My point? Mark is an entrepreneur just like a Silicon Valley high- tech founder with a garage startup. He needs the principles of the Lean Startup just as much as the folks I thought of as classic entrepreneurs do.

As I have applied Lean Startup ideas in an ever-widening variety of companies and industries, I have come to believe that intrapreneurs have much more in common with the rest of the community of entrepreneurs than most people believe.

This book is for entrepreneurs of all stripes: from young visionaries with little backing but great ideas to seasoned visionaries within larger companies such as Mark—and the people who hold them accountable. The Lean Startup is a set of practices for helping entrepreneurs increase their odds of building a successful startup. It says nothing about size of the company, the industry, or the sector of the economy.

Anyone who is creating a new product or business under conditions of extreme uncertainty is an entrepreneur whether he or she knows it or not and whether working in a government agency, a venture-backed company, a nonpro t, or a decidedly for-pro t company with financial investors.

The word institution connotes bureaucracy, process, even lethargy. How can that be part of a startup? Yet successful startups are full of activities associated with building an institution: hiring creative employees, coordinating their activities, and creating a company culture that delivers results. We often lose sight of the fact that a startup is not just about a product, a technological breakthrough, or even a brilliant idea.

A startup is greater than the sum of its parts; it is an acutely human enterprise. This is true of a grocery store, an e-commerce website, a consulting service, and a nonpro t social service agency. In every case, the organization is dedicated to uncovering a new source of value for customers and cares about the impact of its product on those customers. Startups use many kinds of innovation: novel scienti c discoveries, repurposing an existing technology for a new use, devising a new business model that unlocks value that was hidden, or simply bringing a product or service to a new location or a previously underserved set of customers.

There is one more important part of this definition: the context in which the innovation happens. Most businesses—large and small alike—are excluded from this context. Startups are designed to confront situations of extreme uncertainty. To open up a new business that is an exact clone of an existing business all the way down to the business model, pricing, target customer, and product may be an attractive economic investment, but it is not a startup because its success depends only on execution—so much so that this success can be modeled with high accuracy.

This is why so many small businesses can be nanced with simple bank loans; the level of risk and uncertainty is understood well enough that a loan o cer can assess its prospects.

Most tools from general management are not designed to ourish in the harsh soil of extreme uncertainty in which startups thrive. The future is unpredictable, customers face a growing array of alternatives, and the pace of change is ever increasing.

Yet most startups—in garages and enterprises alike—still are managed by using standard forecasts, product milestones, and detailed business plans. They wanted to liberate taxpayers from expensive tax stores by automating the process of collecting information typically found on W-2 forms the end-of-year statement that most employees receive from their employer that summarizes their taxable wages for the year. The startup quickly ran into di culties. After numerous conversations with potential customers, the team lit upon the idea of having customers take photographs of the forms directly from their cell phone.

In the process of testing this concept, customers asked something unexpected: would it be possible to nish the whole tax return right on the phone itself? That was not an easy task. Traditional tax preparation requires consumers to wade through hundreds of questions, many forms, and a lot of paperwork. This startup tried something novel by deciding to ship an early version of its product that could do much less than a complete tax package.

The initial version worked only for consumers with a very simple return to le, and it worked only in California. From that single picture, the company developed the technology to compile and le most of the EZ tax return. Compared with the drudgery of traditional tax ling, the new product—called SnapTax—provides a magical experience.

From its modest beginning, SnapTax grew into a signi cant startup success story. Its nationwide launch in showed that customers loved it, to the tune of more than , downloads in the rst three weeks.

However, the name of this company may surprise you. They are paid a full salary and benefits. They come into a regular office every day. Yet they are entrepreneurs. Stories like this one are not nearly as common inside large corporations as they should be. One remarkable part of the SnapTax story is what the team leaders said when I asked them to account for their unlikely success. Did they hire superstar entrepreneurs from outside the company?

No, they assembled a team from within Intuit. Did they face constant meddling from senior management, which is the bane of innovation teams in many companies? Did they have a huge team, a large budget, and lots of marketing dollars? Nope, they started with a team of five. It can, but to do so requires a new management discipline, one that needs to be mastered not just by practicing entrepreneurs seeking to build the next big thing but also by the people who support them, nurture them, and hold them accountable.

In other words, cultivating entrepreneurship is the responsibility of senior management. Today, a cutting-edge company such as Intuit can point to success stories like SnapTax because it has recognized the need for a new management paradigm. This is a realization that was years in the making.

Their success was far from inevitable; they faced numerous competitors, an uncertain future, and an initially tiny market. A decade later, the company went public and subsequently fended o well-publicized attacks from larger incumbents, including the software behemoth Microsoft. Partly with the help of famed venture capitalist John Doerr, Intuit became a fully diversi ed enterprise, a member of the Fortune that now provides dozens of market-leading products across its major divisions.

Flash-forward to Cook was frustrated. Simply put, too many of its new products were failing. By traditional standards, Intuit is an extremely well- managed company, but as Scott dug into the root causes of those failures, he came to a di cult conclusion: the prevailing management paradigm he and his company had been practicing was inadequate to the problem of continuous innovation in the modern economy.

He came across my early work on the Lean Startup and asked me to give a talk at Intuit. In Silicon Valley this is not the kind of invitation you turn down. I admit I was curious. My conversations with Cook and Intuit chief executive o cer CEO Brad Smith were my initiation into the thinking of modern general managers, who struggle with entrepreneurship every bit as much as do venture capitalists and founders in a garage. They are working to build entrepreneurship and risk taking into all their divisions.

Because TurboTax does most of its sales around tax season in the United States, it used to have an extremely conservative culture. Over the course of the year, the marketing and product teams would conceive one major initiative that would be rolled out just in time for tax season. Now they test over ve hundred di erent changes in a two-and-a-half-month tax season.

The team can make a change live on its website on Thursday, run it over the weekend, read the results on Monday, and come to conclusions starting Tuesday; then they rebuild new tests on Thursday and launch the next set on Thursday night. So you build up a society of politicians and salespeople. And then you create entrepreneurs who run and learn and can retest and relearn as opposed to a society of politicians.

Every business today has a website. Scott says, It goes against the grain of what people have been taught in business and what leaders have been taught. They love the chance to quickly get their baby out into the market. They love the chance to have the customer vote instead of the suits voting. The real issue is with the leaders and the middle managers. There are many business leaders who have been successful because of analysis.

The amount of time a company can count on holding on to market leadership to exploit its earlier innovations is shrinking, and this creates an imperative for even the most entrenched companies to invest in innovation. In other words, established companies need to gure out how to accomplish what Scott Cook did in , but on an industrial scale and with an established cohort of managers steeped in traditional management culture. Ever the maverick, Cook asked me to put these ideas to the test, and so I gave a talk that was simulcast to all seven thousand—plus Intuit employees during which I explained the theory of the Lean Startup, repeating my de nition: an organization designed to create new products and services under conditions of extreme uncertainty.

What happened next is etched in my memory. It has three parts, and we here at Intuit match all three parts of that definition. Intuit is proof that this kind of thinking can work in established companies.

Under the old model, it took an average of 5. They have decades of legacy systems and legacy thinking to overcome. However, their leadership in adopting entrepreneurial management is starting to pay off. Leadership requires creating conditions that enable employees to do the kinds of experimentation that entrepreneurship requires.

For example, changes in TurboTax enabled the Intuit team to develop ve hundred experiments per tax season. Intuit invested in systems that increased the speed at which tests could be built, deployed, and analyzed. As an engineer and later as a manager, I was accustomed to measuring progress by making sure our work proceeded according to plan, was high quality, and cost about what we had projected.

After many years as an entrepreneur, I started to worry about measuring progress in this way. What if we found ourselves building something that nobody wanted? In that case what did it matter if we did it on time and on budget? Entrepreneurs, under pressure to succeed, are wildly creative when it comes to demonstrating what we have learned. We can all tell a good story when our job, career, or reputation depends on it. However, learning is cold comfort to employees who are following an entrepreneur into the unknown.

It is cold comfort to the investors who allocate precious money, time, and energy to entrepreneurial teams. It is cold comfort to the organizations—large and small—that depend on entrepreneurial innovation to survive. You cannot give it to customers and cannot return it to limited partners. Is it any wonder that learning has a bad name in entrepreneurial and managerial circles? Yet if the fundamental goal of entrepreneurship is to engage in organization building under conditions of extreme uncertainty, its most vital function is learning.

We must learn the truth about which elements of our strategy are working to realize our vision and which are just crazy. We must learn what customers really want, not what they say they want or what we think they should want.

We must discover whether we are on a path that will lead to growing a sustainable business. In the Lean Startup model, we are rehabilitating learning with a concept I call validated learning. Validated learning is not after-the- fact rationalization or a good story designed to hide failure. It is a rigorous method for demonstrating progress when one is embedded in the soil of extreme uncertainty in which startups grow.

It is more concrete, more accurate, and faster than market forecasting or classical business planning. It is the principal antidote to the lethal problem of achieving failure: successfully executing a plan that leads nowhere.

Those of us involved in the founding of IMVU aspired to be serious strategic thinkers. Our main concerns in the early days dealt with the following questions: What should we build and for whom? What market could we enter and dominate? How could we build durable value that would not be subject to erosion by competition? In , that market had hundreds of millions of consumers actively participating worldwide.

However, the majority of the customers who were using IM products were not paying for the privilege. IM is an example of a market that involves strong network effects. In other words, the more people in the network, the more valuable the network. This makes intuitive sense: the value to each participant is driven primarily by how many other people he or she can communicate with. Imagine a world in which you own the only telephone; it would have no value. Only when other people also have a telephone does it become valuable.

In , the IM market was locked up by a handful of incumbents. The top three networks controlled more than 80 percent of the overall usage and were in the process of consolidating their gains in market share at the expense of a number of smaller players.

The reason for that wisdom is simple. Because of the power of network e ects, IM products have high switching costs. At IMVU we settled on a strategy of building a product that would combine the large mass appeal of traditional IM with the high revenue per customer of three-dimensional 3D video games and virtual worlds. Because of the near impossibility of bringing a new IM network to market, we decided to build an IM add-on product that would interoperate with the existing networks.

Thus, customers would be able to adopt the IMVU virtual goods and avatar communication technology without having to switch IM providers, learn a new user interface, and—most important—bring their friends with them.

In fact, we thought this last point was essential. For the add-on product to be useful, customers would have to use it with their existing friends. Every communication would come embedded with an invitation to join IMVU.

Our product would be inherently viral, spreading throughout the existing IM networks like an epidemic. To achieve that viral growth, it was important that our add-on product support as many of the existing IM networks as possible and work on all kinds of computers. Six Months to Launch With this strategy in place, my cofounders and I began a period of intense work. As the chief technology o cer, it was my responsibility, among other things, to write the software that would support IM interoperability across networks.

My cofounders and I worked for months, putting in crazy hours struggling to get our rst product released. We gave ourselves a hard deadline of six months — days—to launch the product and attract our rst paying customers.

It was a grueling schedule, but we were determined to launch on time. We spent endless hours arguing about which bugs to x and which we could live with, which features to cut and which to try to cram in. It was a wonderful and terrifying time: we were full of hope about the possibilities for success and full of fear about the consequences of shipping a bad product.

Personally, I was worried that the low quality of the product would tarnish my reputation as an engineer. In our situation, many entrepreneurial teams give in to fear and postpone the launch date. Although I understand this impulse, I am glad we persevered, since delay prevents many startups from getting the feedback they need. Our previous failures made us more afraid of another, even worse, outcome than shipping a bad product: building something that nobody wants.

And so, teeth clenched and apologies at the ready, we released our product to the public. Launch And then—nothing happened! It turned out that our fears were unfounded, because nobody even tried our product. At rst I was relieved because at least nobody was nding out how bad the product was, but soon that gave way to serious frustration. We brought in a steady ow of customers through our online registration and download process. We were making improvements to the underlying product continuously, shipping bug xes and new changes daily.

However, despite our best e orts, we were able to persuade only a pathetically small number of people to buy the product. In retrospect, one good decision we made was to set clear revenue targets for those early days. Many friends and family members were asked okay, begged.

As they rose, our struggles increased. We soon ran out of friends and family; our frustration escalated. Our failure to move the numbers prodded us to accelerate our e orts to bring customers into our o ce for in-person interviews and usability tests. I wish I could say that I was the one to realize our mistake and suggest the solution, but in truth, I was the last to admit the problem.

In short, our entire strategic analysis of the market was utterly wrong. We gured this out empirically, through experimentation, rather than through focus groups or market research. Customers could not tell us what they wanted; most, after all, had never heard of 3D avatars. Instead, they revealed the truth through their action or inaction as we struggled to make the product better. So exactly what would you like me to do? Imagine a seventeen-year-old girl sitting down with us to look at this product.

But since she was in the room with us, we were able to talk her into doing it. You want me to risk inviting one of my friends? What are they going to think of me? So we built a single-player version. What is the point of a single-player experience for a social product? Out of further desperation, we introduced a feature called ChatNow that allows you to push a button and be randomly matched with somebody else anywhere in the world. The only thing you have in common is that you both pushed the button at the same time.

A stranger on my AIM buddy list? One or two, maybe? Our customers revealed that this was nonsense. We had a mental model for how people used software that was years out of date, and so eventually, painfully, after dozens of meetings like that, it started to dawn on us that the IM add-on concept was fundamentally flawed.

They did not consider having to learn how to use a new IM program a barrier; on the contrary, our early adopters used many di erent IM programs simultaneously. Our customers were not intimidated by the idea of having to take their friends with them to a new IM network; it turned out that they enjoyed that challenge. Even more surprising, our assumption that customers would want to use avatar-based IM primarily with their existing friends was also wrong.

They wanted to make new friends, an activity that 3D avatars are particularly well suited to facilitating. Bit by bit, customers tore apart our seemingly brilliant initial strategy.

Throwing My Work Away Perhaps you can sympathize with our situation and forgive my obstinacy. After all, it was my work over the prior months that needed to be thrown away. I had slaved over the software that was required to make our IM program interoperate with other networks, which was at the heart of our original strategy. I felt betrayed. I was a devotee of the latest in software development methods known collectively as agile development , which promised to help drive waste out of product development.

However, despite that, I had committed the biggest waste of all: building a product that our customers refused to use. That was really depressing. I wondered: in light of the fact that my work turned out to be a waste of time and energy, would the company have been just as well o if I had spent the last six months on a beach sipping umbrella drinks? Had I really been needed? Would it have been better if I had not done any work at all?

There is, as I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, always one last refuge for people aching to justify their own failure. We never would have learned that our strategy was awed. There is truth in this excuse: what we learned during those critical early months set IMVU on a path that would lead to our eventual breakout success.

How much of our e ort contributed to the essential lessons we needed to learn? This question is at the heart of the lean manufacturing revolution; it is the rst question any lean manufacturing adherent is trained to ask. In the world of software, the agile development methodologies I had practiced until that time had their origins in lean thinking.

They were designed to eliminate waste too. The answer came to me slowly over the subsequent years. Lean thinking de nes value as providing bene t to the customer; anything else is waste. But in a startup, who the customer is and what the customer might nd valuable are unknown, part of the very uncertainty that is an essential part of the de nition of a startup.

I realized that as a startup, we needed a new de nition of value. The real progress we had made at IMVU was what we had learned over those rst months about what creates value for customers. Anything we had done during those months that did not contribute to our learning was a form of waste.

Would it have been possible to learn the same things with less e ort? Clearly, the answer is yes. For one thing, think of all the debate and prioritization of e ort that went into features that customers would never discover. If we had shipped sooner, we could have avoided that waste. Also consider all the waste caused by our incorrect strategic assumptions.

I had built interoperability for more than a dozen di erent IM clients and networks. Was this really necessary to test our assumptions? Could we have gotten the same feedback from our customers with half as many networks?

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Boxer TTL S.C. (en adelante Boxer) con domicilio ubicado en: calle Manuel E. Izaguirre 19, departamento 502, piso 5, Col. Ciudad Satelite Municipio Nucalpan de Juarez, C.P. 53100, Estado de México, en términos de la Ley Federal de Protección de Datos Personales en Posesión de los Particulares (LFPDPPP) del Reglamento de la Ley Federal de Protección de Datos Personales en Posesión de los Particulares (Reglamento), y de los propios Lineamientos del Aviso de privacidad (Lineamientos), este acto notifica a los titulares de los datos personales que posee, la forma y los términos en los que sus datos serán tratados.

El tratamiento de datos personales del titular, tales como: nombre, correo electrónico, teléfono, código postal, género y edad que obren en poder de Boxer, tendrán como finalidades necesarias: la validación de recepción de promociones de Boxer.

Como finalidades secundarias del tratamiento de datos se encuentran:

  1. La promoción, publicidad, contratación y colocación de todo tipo de productos y/o servicios, asi como la prueba de los mismos, tanto de Boxer como de sus Clientes.
  2. Estadísticas, desarrollo de todo tipo de productos y/o servicios, incluyendo pruebas de los mismos de Boxer, de conformidad con el objeto social y lo establecido en la ley, autorizando desde éste momento su transferencia a otras empresas.

Boxer de ninguna forma comercializará con sus datos personales en actividades distintas a las señaladas en las finalidades del presente Aviso de Privacidad.


Los datos personales en poder de Boxer son recabados de manera licita e informada y podrán ser transferidos a cualquier tercero con los que Boxer tenga o llegare a tener una relación jurídica, en caso de que así lo estime necesario, para ello se hará del conocimiento del tercero que los trate, las finalidades con las que fueron obtenidos y por lo tanto con las que los podrá usar y/o tratar, procurando su confidencialidad, seguridad física y el establecimiento de procedimientos a seguir en caso de vulneraciones. Aquellos datos personales que obtenga Boxer a través de sus Clientes (Usuarios), de terceros o de fuentes de acceso público, serán tratados con la misma finalidad con la que fueron recabados por el responsable original y con alguna de las finalidades descritas en el presente aviso de privacidad.

Boxer responde a cualquier autoridad de manera enunciativa mas no limitativa: financiera, judicial, fiscal, penal, administrativa, por lo cual, en caso de requerimientos de dichas autoridades podrá transferir los datos personales.

Para realizar este tipo de transferencias de datos no se requiere de su consentimiento por estar permitidas en términos de la LFPDPPP.


Boxer mantendrá en su poder los datos personales a los que se refiere el presente Aviso de Privacidad, hasta por un periodo de al menos 10 (diez) años, o durante el tiempo que la relación jurídica entre el Titular de los Datos y Boxer, ya sea directa o indirecta permaneza vigente.


Los datos personales tratados por Boxer tendrán un tratamiento confidencial y limitado a la finalidad con la que son recabados, procurando en todo momento su seguridad física, controles de acceso, idoneidad y mantenimiento constante en las instalaciones, repositorios, medios físicos, ópticos o cualquier otro medio en los que sean almacenados.

Cualquier vulneración a los datos personales sujetos a la LFPDPPP o a los repositorios físicos o electrónicos en donde éstos sean almacenados por Boxer, serán notificados en su página de Internet, a través de medios masivos de comunicación y/o directo al titular de los Datos.


Los titulares de los Datos, como titulares, tienen derecho a (i) acceder a sus datos personales en posesión de Boxer y conocer los detalles del tratamiento de los mismos, (ii) rectificarlos en caso de estar desactualizados, ser inexactos o estar incompletos, (iii) cancelarlos cuando considere que no están siendo utilizados conforme a los principios, deberes y obligaciones aplicables, u (iv) oponerse al tratamiento de los mismo para fines específicos. Estos derechos se conocen como los Derechos ARCO.

Para el ejercicio de sus Derechos ARCO por favor envíe la solicitud al correo electrónico contacto@linkerbox.mx. La solicitud deberá contener la siguiente información y documentación:

Nombre y copia de identificación oficial vigente del titular y/o su representante legal. En el caso del representante legal se deberá acompañar del documento con el que se acredite su personalidad. Los documentos deberán ser escaneados y adjuntados al correo electrónico para verificar su veracidad.

La descripción clara y precisa de los datos personales respecto de los cuales se busca ejercer los Derechos ARCO, así como el derecho o derechos que se desea ejercer, lo cual podrá hacerse en el texto del correo electrónico o en un documento adjunto escaneado. Dicho documento deberá estar debidamente firmado al final del mismo y rubricado al calce de cada una de las hojas.

Señalar expresamente el deseo de recibir la contestación de Boxer a su petición a través del correo electrónico que usted nos proporcione.

Cualquier otro elemento o documento digitalizado que facilite la localización de los datos personales.

En el caso de solicitudes de rectificación de datos personales, el titular de los datos deberá indicar, además de lo señalado anteriormente, las modificaciones a realizarse y aportar la documentación que sustente su petición.

Tratándose de solicitudes de acceso a datos personales, procederá la entrega previa acreditación de la identidad del solicitante o representante legal, según corresponda.

Boxer emitirá la respectiva contestación y se tramitará la solicitud en los plazos establecidos por la LFPDPPP. En los casos de solicitudes de cancelación u oposición de datos personales, Boxer de procederá al bloqueo y supresión de los datos, no obstante los conservará exclusivamente para efectos de las responsabilidades nacidas del nuevo tratamiento.


Boxer se reserva el derecho de efectuar modificaciones o actualizaciones a los términos y condiciones del presente Aviso, para la atención de cambios legislativos, políticas internas, nuevos requerimientos para la prestación u ofrecimiento de servicios y prácticas del mercado.

Dichas modificaciones estarán disponibles para los titulares de los datos a través de su página de Internet. En el Aviso se incluirá la fecha de la última actualización del mismo.


Al proporcionar sus datos personales, usted otorga su consentimiento para que éstos sean tratados en los términos de este Aviso y con estricto apego al mismo, a la LFPDPPP, su Reglamento y a las disposiciones aplicables.

La fecha de la última actualización al presente aviso de privacidad: 19 de mayo de 2021.